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SAVINGS ACCOUNT TRUSTS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
I. Introduction
For over one hundred years various American courts have recognized, on
one theory or another, the validity of savings bank trust accounts.' Such ac-
counts, often called "Totten trusts" after the New York case which first crystal-
lized the doctrine,2 have now been supported by decisions in nineteen jurisdic-
tions' and sanctioned by statute in one.4 The trust account has become a pop-
ular method of disposing of relatively small sums5 without the necessity of draw-
ing a will or incurring the expense and inconvenience of probate.'
As a "poor man's will"7 the trust account has demonstrated its utility; but
it has posed conceptual problems of some nicety to generations of judges and
theorists. Most of the difficulties spring from the courts' stubborn insistence on
trust terminology for a judicial creation' that is not a trust at all. The doctrine
1 See generally 1 G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 47 (2d ed. 1965); 1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58 et seq. (3d ed. 1967); Bogert,
The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 'CORNELL L.Q. 159 (1916); Cohan,
Pennsylvania Tentative Trusts: Problems and Problem Areas, 110 U. PENN. L. REv. 972
(1962); Ereli, The Trust: Salvation by Muddle, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 190, 220 (1964); Lar-
rimore, judicial Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L.J. 312, 315-16 (1905); Moynihan,
Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts, 22 B.U. L. REv. 271 (1942); Scott, Trusts and
the Statute of Wills, 43 HARv. L. REv. 521, 540-44 (1930); Slatter, Joint Accounts and Trusts
Created by Bank Deposits, 2 BRoox. L. REv. 27 (1933); the following Notes: Revocability of
Trust Deposits in Savings Banks, 4 MINN. L. REv. 56 (1919); Savings Bank Trusts in New
York, 37 YALE L.J. 1133 (1928); Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICE. L. REv. 37 (1934);
The Theory of the Tentative Trust, 87 U. PENN. L. REv. 847 (1939); Matter of Totten -
An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DE PAUL L. REv. 117 (1956); Totten Trusts in Kansas,
9 KAN. L. REv. 46 (1960) ; Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C. L. REv. 214 (1963) ;
Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REv. 1189 (1963); Illinois Totten Trust, 48 CH.-KENT L.
REv. 107 (1971); and the following Annotations: 157 A.L.R. 925 (1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324
(1947); 38 A.L.R. 2d 1243 (1954); 46 A.L.R.3d 487 (1972).
2 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). The generic term "Totten trust"
is rather misleading, as not all such trusts are of the type validated in Totten.
3 See Gross v. Douglass State Bank, 261 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Kan. 1965); Reidy v. Almich,
4 Ariz. App. 144, 418 P.2d 390 (1966); Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P.2d
565 (1945); Cressy v. Fisher, 16 Conn. Supp. 391 (1949); but see Fasano v. Meliso, 146
Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959); Delaware Trust Company v. Fitzmaurice, 27 Del. Ch. 101,
31 A.2d 383 (1943); In re Scott's Estate, 96 F. Supp. 290 (D.D.C. 1951); Seymour v. Sey-
mour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 426, 4 S.E. 2d 199 (1939);
Estate of Petralia, 32 Ill. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965), aff'd, 48 Ill. App. 2d 122, 198 N. E.2d
200 (1964); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344, 231 S.W.2d 2 (1950); Littig v. Mt. Calvary Church,
101 Md. 494, 61 A. 635 (1905); Greeley v. Flynn, 310 Mass. 23, 36 N.E.2d 394 (1941);
Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918); In re Darnato, 86 N.J. Super. 107,
206 A.2d 171 (1965); Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); Merigan v.
McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 A. 994 (1903); Petition of Atkinson, 16 R.I. 413, 16 A. 712
(1889); Leader Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hamilton, 46 Tenn. App. 368, 330 S.W.2d
33 (1959); In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956). See also RESTATE-
MFNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959) and comments thereto.
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-216 (1963).
5 See 1 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at § 56.3 n.3. The doctrine has also been applied to
certificates of deposit issued to purchasers as trustees for another, as well as to Savings & Loan
and building and loan accounts. See Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 487, 492 n.4 '(1972).
6 See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-104, which expressly adopts the Totten theory. But
see, semble contra, § 6-104(e) : trust accounts are not revocable by will - a deviation from the
Totten doctrine.
7 Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 103
(1953). Other such "wills" are survivorship ownership and life insurance. See SHAFFER, THE
PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 63 (1972).
8 See Larrimore, supra note 1.
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of trust was fixed upon as a handy means of validating this species of transfer;
that it did, but problems of no little difficulty were imported with it.
II. Origin and Elements of the Doctrine
A. Witzel v. Chapin
The very first American case involving a trust account9 sounded the major
themes, and the changes have been ringing ever since. In June, 1849, William
Witzel deposited five hundred dollars in his savings account, "in trust for Ann
Witzel," and these words were written on the face of the bank book. There was
no further evidence of the depositor's intention to create a trust. Subsequently,
the depositor made deposits and--significantly-withdrawals. On his death the
beneficiary, who had not known of the account during the depositor's lifetime,
claimed against the depositor's administrator.
Counsel for the claimant argued that the deposit was a valid inter vivos
gift or, alternatively, "[a]t least, such deposit was valid as an executed trust or
use for the sole benefit of Ann S. Witzel,"'-0 and that the money was "beyond the
control of the deceased except as a trustee, and his administrator has no right as
such to distribute the fund among the next of kin."'
Against these contentions it was asserted that the cestui could not have called
upon the depositor to execute the trust nor had she any knowledge of its existence.
The trust was "merely voluntary"' 2 and executory. The depositor "used the fund
as his own, drew it out and expended it. This is evidenced by his own acts, that
he did not consider it vested."" It was also argued that:
A trust being an equitable right or interest in property real or personal
distinct from the real owner.., nothing, according to this rule, could ever
have vested in Ann Witzel, for she never had any interest in this fund distinct
from that of the legal owner.... 4
Finally, the operation of the Statute of Wills was impliedly invoked: "... could
Ann Witzel have called on the deceased in his lifetime to execute this trust? If she
could not, then by his death she can acquire no more extended right."'-9
The Surrogate reviewed various cases involving resulting trusts and joint
bank accounts&' on the question of the validity of voluntary trusts with power of
revocation, and found that if such trusts have been allowed to remain after the
settlor's death, they should stand.' In deciding to bring the Witzel account into
9 Witzel v. Chapin, 3 Bradf. Surr. 386 (1855).
10 Id. at 387.
11 Id. The "control" issue, of course, cuts against the claimant; if the depositor's control
was that of a trustee, his withdrawals for his own use constituted breach of trust. As it hap-
pened, his control over the money was absolute.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 388.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 E.g., Thorpe v. Owen, 5 Beav. 244 (1842); Gaskell v. Gaskell, 2 Y. & J. 502 (1828);
Wheatley v. Purr, 1 Keen 551 (1836) ; Stapleton v. Stapleton, 14 Sire. 186 (1840).
17 A curiously circular conclusion.
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the class of valid revocable trusts the court took note of the popularity of trust
accounts:
The class of deposits in savings institutions, of which the one in question in
the present case is an example, is of frequent occurrence. This is a favorite
mode of making trusts, and yet they are not ordinarily considered as irrevo-
cable.
18
The withdrawals made by the depositor indicated to the court that the trust was
not treated as irrevocable,' " and the retention of power to revoke the deposit did
not invalidate the trust.
2 0
The continuance of any portion of the deposit in trust is evidence of a contin-
uation pro tanto, of the original intention, and the intestate having died,
leaving the trust unrevoked as to a certain sum, the rights of the cestui que
trust then became fixed.
21
Thus the deposit itself raised a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a valid
trust and the underlying intent to create such a trust.22 The creation of the trust,
for the Witzel court, seemed to be entirely a matter of intent-a question of fact.
"[There must be some facts inconsistent with the idea that a gift was intended"
in order to invalidate the transfer.22
The Surrogate thus articulated a doctrine under which a valid trust can
arise from the deposit of money "in trust" for another, absent a showing that
the depositor did not intend to establish such a trust. The form of deposit alone
raises the presumption, or rather the inference, of intent; and the intent can be
effectuated by means of the trust doctrine. The beneficiary need not know of the
account. The funds are subject to augmentation and diminution and are subject
to the depositor's complete control; withdrawal constitutes revocation pro tanto.
The court in Witzel, by giving effect to the depositor's intent, sought to
recognize the general validity of a practice which had already become wide-
spread. It considered two theories on which to sustain trust accounts. The gift
theory was obviously infirm-there was no real divestiture and no real delivery-
and the trust theory, though not entirely satisfactory, was obviously more con-
genial. It is perhaps significant that the transaction was not directly attacked as
testamentary. Nor were various elements of strict trust theory applied to the
facts, e.g., the lack of fiduciary relationship. The inability of the beneficiary to call
for execution of the trust was explained as resulting from her tenuous interest in
the fund; yet this interest was not defined and appears to have been sui generis.
Moreover, the position of the depositor's creditors was not considered as it did not
18 3 Bradf. Surr. at 391.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 392.
21 Id. This language, remarkably similar to that employed in Matter of Totten, indicates
that the Surrogate too regarded the trust as "tentative merely" until the depositor's death.
22 "It is not necessary to declare generally that deposits of this character are always con-
clusive evidence of a trust; there may be circumstances connected with particular cases,





arise under the facts. 4 Had the Surrogate been presented with an argument
characterizing the deposit as testamentary and bearing little relation to the
paradigmatic trust in that no fiduciary relationship arose and no control over
the funds was ever relinquished, the decision might have been different. Yet, on
the central issues of intent and control, the court was willing to sustain the validity
of the trust even without precedent.
B. Irrevocable Savings Account Trusts and the Totten Case
Subsequent New York cases25 and decisions in various other states 6 recog-
nized the existence of a valid trust from the form of a trust account if it was the
intent of the depositor to establish one. But the trust was construed as irrevo-
cable;2" filling in the bank book form or signature card created an immediate
and complete irrevocable trust with a corresponding immediate interest in the
beneficiary. This conclusion seems to have resulted from abhorrence of the
indeterminate interest of the beneficiary under the Witzel rule. It was also
partially the result of a lingering confusion of the trust account with an inter
vivos gift-a confusion which has survived to the present day.2" Moreover,
judicial insistence on the irrevocability of the trust might well have been related
to the sound general principle that a trust mandates a substantial divestment of
control on the part of the settlor. In any event, if the account was seen as ir-
revocable the estate of the settlor could be surcharged for any amount he
may have withdrawn. The advantage of the trust account was, under this in-
terpretation, minimized. The essential issue before the court in Matter of Tot-
ten,9 half a century after Witzel, was one of restoring the social utility of the
trust account: how could the surcharge be avoided while still maintaining the
trust character of the account?
The claimant in Totten claimed against the estate of the depositor for money
due from savings accounts set up by the depositor as trustee for the claimant.
There was no evidence of intent other than the signature cards. The depositor
treated all the accounts marked "in trust for" as her own, withdrawing at will.
On her death the accounts were closed and the proceeds were delivered to the
named beneficiaries.
The court was unwilling to infer as a matter of fact that the decedent in-
tended to establish an irrevocable trust in favor of the claimant.2" Indeed,
"[a]side from what took place when the deposits were made, every act of the
decedent, with one exception,- [was] opposed to the theory of a trust.
812
24 Id.
25 These cases are collected and analyzed in Re Vaughn's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260
N.Y.S. 197 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Of special interest is Harrison v. Totten, 53 App. Div. 178,
65 N.Y.S. 725 (1900). William H. B. Totten should perhaps have read it more carefully.
26 See the exhaustive annotation which appears after the report of Martin v. Funk, 75
N.Y. 134 (1878).
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Fasano v. Meliso, 146 Conn. 496, 152 A.2d 512 (1959).
29 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
30 Id. at 118, 71 N.E., at 750.
31 The exception was the closing of one account after cancelling the words "in trust for"
and reopening, with part of the money, another account in the same form as the original.
32 179 N.Y. at 118, 71 N.E. at 750.
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The court noted, however, that the courts in developing the doctrine of trust
accounts had sought to adapt the law to the custom of the people. Finding no
mandate for declaring the trusts irrevocable as a matter of law and desiring to
maintain the institution of trust accounts, the court announced a rule for their
governance:
A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for
another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the
lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will,
until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some un-
equivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to
the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without
revocation, or some decisive act of declaration or disaffirmance, the pre-
sumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand
at the death of the depositor. 3
III. Conceptual Variations
Matter of Totten followed the Witzel rule in that the effect of the deposit was
to create the inference of a relationship wherein the depositor can dispose of the
money as he wishes, and the beneficiary has no right of possession or enjoyment
until the depositor's death. Totten sharpens Witzel, however, in several important
respects. The trust account in Witzel could be seen as evincing a completed inter
vivos transaction subject to defeasance. We shall see that the courts which con-
strue trust accounts as giving rise to completed revocable trusts at the moment of
deposit generally follow this view. But Totten took another tack.
The Totten court viewed the transaction as generating an incipient relation-
ship that was not completed until the depositor's death.- The trust, until then,
was "tentative merely"; the beneficiary's right to any of the fund was inchoate.
Such is the interpretation given Totten by subsequent New York cases."5 This
conclusion is mandated by the desirability, noted earlier, of facilitating the
depositor's control over the money (the genius of the entire concept). For if the
transaction is interpreted as giving rise to a revocable trust, then the beneficiary
must have a form of equitable ownership to comport with basic trust doctrine
(even though other incidents of the trust relationship may not be present). How,
then, can the depositor's ability to invade the funds-to say nothing of his cred-
itors' ability to do the same, the sanctioning of application of the funds towards the
depositor's funeral expenses, and more-be justified? The position that a trust
account gives rise to a revocable trust will be criticized later; the New York courts
have had this particular objection in mind for quite some time. The problem is
essentially one of timing. At what moment does an enforceable trust spring into
being?
The New York courts' answer has been to regard the trust deposit as
33 179 N.Y. at 125-26, 71 N.E. at 752.
34 See Tibbits v. Zink, 231 App. Div. 339, 341, 247 N.Y.S. 300, 303 (1931).
35 See, e.g., Matter of United States Trust Company, 117 App. Div. 178, 180, 102 N.Y.S.
271, 272 (1907). The dissent maintained that the trust was completely constituted at the time
of deposit, subject to revocation.
[February 1974]
[Vol. 49:686]
establishing a prima facie "tentative" trust," an admittedly novel concept."' Once
this position is understood, its sequelae can be harmonized. Thus, the predecease
of the beneficiary extinguishes the trust even if the depositor does nothing at all.
The relationship is "tentative merely" and does not ripen into a proper trust until
the depositor's death; the beneficiary has no real interest until then.28 Similarly, it
has been held that under certain circumstances the depositor's creditors can reach
trust account funds after his death on the grounds that placing the funds in ac-
counts over which he had control while alive constitutes a fraud on the creditors.
39
The point is that no enforceable trust arises until the depositor dies or makes the
trust irrevocable. °
Courts outside New York that have considered the issue have occasionally
held that a trust account creates an irrevocable trust, absent evidence of contrary
intent. 1 Such a view accords with the traditional principle that trusts are ir-
revocable unless a power of revocation is expressly reserved." But there seems
to be little advantage in opening a trust account under such a rule. It has been
observed that nothing is achieved by such a transfer that could not have been ac-
complished by a direct gift, except perhaps postponement of the beneficiary's
enjoyment.43
Other jurisdictions have regarded the trust account as a revocable trust.4"
As noted above, such a view requires that an interest be vested in the beneficiary
at the time the deposit is made, subject to a power of revocation in the depositor.45
Each withdrawal is construed as a pro tanto revocation. Bogert states the principle
supporting this view:
The uncertain nature of the trust before the depositor's death may often
merely mean that the trust is subject to a power of revocation. This seems a
view preferable to the "tentative" or incomplete trust theory ... The only
effect of death of the depositor is to remove the power of revocation. It
does not complete the trust, but renders it irrevocable.46
This interpretation, at first blush, appears more congruent with traditional trust
doctrine than does that of the New York courts. It is the position of Professor
Scot 4 and the Restatement.," Yet it contains serious weaknesses, most of which
36 See, e.g., Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
37 Id. at 618, 262 N.Y.S. at 626 (dictum).
38 Matter of Kelly, 151 Misc. 277, 271 N.Y.S. 457 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
39 Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y.S. 529 (1908).
40 "The mere fact that the presumption of trust is created only in respect to the balance
on hand in the account at the death of the depositor, demonstrates that the theory of the
decision is that the 'trust? springs ino being only at the moment of his death." Matter of Reich,
146 Misc. 616, 618, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
41 Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 A. 315 (1935). See Gobeille v. Allison, 30 R.I.
525, 76 A. 354 (1910).
42 G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGaRT, supra note 1, at § 992; Note, Savings Account Trusts,
49 VA. L. Rav. 1189, 1191 (1963).
43 Even this is doubtful. The trustee performs no duties and the beneficiary might there-
fore be able to compel termination of the trust. See Note, Savings Account Trusts, 49 VA.
L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1963).
44 See, e.g., Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 A. 317 (1935).
45 Kardon v. Willing, 20 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1937). See Moynihan, supra note 1, at
276-77.
46 G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT, supra note 1, at § 47.
47 See A. SCOTT, supra note 1.
48 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
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spring from the imposition of revocable trust theory on the trust account. As an
initial matter, trust accounts could, under this theory, be nullified as testamentary.
Admittedly, reservation of a power of revocation, even coupled with power to
modify and an equitable life interest in the settlor, will not invalidate a disposition
as testamentary. 9 But the critical quantum of control is reached with the addi-
tion of the power in the settlor to do what he wishes with the funds. This situa-
tion is of a different species from the normal type of trust with incidents of con-
trol maintained by the settlor. Scott acknowledges that it is "arguable" that trust
accounts so regarded are testamentary dispositions and thus void unless they
comply with the formalities required by the Statute of Wills. 1
Of course, trust accounts under either the "tentative" or the revocable trust
theory are open to the same objection, insofar as the element of control is identical
in both, as is the trust established at the depositor's death. Theoretically, both
tentative and revocable trust accounts are testamentary although the courts have
generally refused to construe them as such. The vice in the revocable trust theory
is simply the discord generated by the juxtaposition of traditional trust concepts
with the trust account in situ. If a trust springs up at the moment of deposit, it is
a trust which is riddled with exceptions to traditional doctrine. The revocable
trust theory is an attempt to avoid the operation of the Statute of Wills by granting
a present interest to the beneficiary immediately when the account is opened. Yet
this interest is subject not only to revocation, in whole or in part, by the depositor;
it is also subject to partial or complete defeasance as a result of judicially sanc-
tioned invasion of the fund by the depositor's creditors,52 personal representatives,5"
or surviving spouse. 4 Moreover, there is no real separation of legal and equitable
ownership; no fiduciary duty is imposed on the depositor; there is no real right
whatsoever vested in the beneficiary.5 These deviations from strict trust theory
strip the trust account of any color of true trust. Those who contend it is a
revocable trust employ a fiction to circumvent the Statute of Wills.
Yet is not the "tentative trust" doctrine equally fictitious? In broad terms it
also is not a trust at all; the Totten court realized this and attempted to call at-
tention to its unique constitution by use of the term "tentative"-a novel term in
the law of trusts. It is at least arguable that, fiction though it be, the tentative
trust theory has at least the virtue of self-consistency. It does not pretend, as does
the revocable trust theory, to be something it is not. The inchoate relationship
established under the Totten trust is indeed "tentative"; the word is completely
apt. As to whether it is guilty of a more fundamental hypocrisy-i.e., going about
as a "trust" when it is not one at all-two points may be made. First, the re-
lationship that arises on the death of the settlor is indeed a trust though subject
to alteration as noted above. The relationship obtaining before that time between
the depositor and his beneficiary is not a trust, and the "tentative trust" doctrine
49 A. SCOTT. supra note 1, at § 58.3.
50 Id. at § 58.5.
51 Id. at § 58.3.
52 See, e.g., Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super. 452, 36 A.2d 242
(1944).
53 A. SCOTr, supra note 1, at § 58.6: G. BoGaRT, supra note 1, at . 104.
54 See, e.g., Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y.S. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
55 See Note, Tentatie Trust Deposits, 39 Drcx. L. Rnv. 37, 38 (1934).
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does not say it is. It is an anticipatory relationship, awaiting the vesting of the
beneficiary's interest, at which point it ripens into a trust. Second, it must be
remembered that the tentative trust is a judicial creation; and the New York
courts have been candid parents indeed. When the rival revocable trust theory
appeared,"0 its advocates maintained that the "incomplete" transfer sanctioned
by the tentative trust theory was testamentary and void. Rather than cast out
the idea of trust accounts altogether or adopt the theoretically unsatisfying revo-
cable trust theory, the New York courts merely admitted that the tentative trust
was not much of a trust, and it was indeed testamentary." The tentative trust,
they argued, should be recognized "in its true character as an alternate method of
decedent devolution, which, in certain aspects at least, is of essentially testamentary
character.""8 It appears that whatever else the tentative trust might be, it is no
hypocrite.
The tentative trust theory is of great practical utility and has been adopted
outside New York.59 Its chief practical advantage over the revocable trust theory
is its flexibility, which has enabled courts to rely upon traditional trust principles
or to go farther afield in the attempt to effectuate the intention of the depositor.6"
The difficulties entailed by the trust account's unique status and underlying
testamentary nature are neatly solved by legislation in New Jersey."' New Jersey
courts had at first rejected the Totten doctrine as violative of both traditional
trust theory and the Statute of Wills,6 2 whereupon a statute allowing banks to pay
the fund to the named beneficiary was passed.6" The statute was modified in
1932 in order to compel banks to pay the beneficiary rather than the depositor's
personal representative," but the courts remained unwilling to enforce trust ac-
counts until the New Jersey Supreme Court construed the 1932 legislation in
favor of the beneficiary of a trust account opened in 1931. The statutes, said the
court,
... were undoubtedly fashioned on the premise that the maintenance of such
an account demonstrated the existence of a donative intent and that this
intent should be accorded full effect through the instrumentality of a gift
revocable pro tanto by the depositor-trustee's withdrawals. In short, the
Legislature has provided for a method whereby property may be transferred
to another upon death. It is of no moment that the transaction does not
satisfy the demands of the Statute of Wills or of the common law concept
of gifts. The Legislature is free to modify these, and here did so.65
56 See Judge Ingraham's dissent in Matter of United States Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178,
182, 102 N.Y.S. 271, 273 (1907).
57 See Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 618, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 626 (Surr. Ct. 1933), where
Surrogate Wingate recommends that the courts should "designate a common excavating imple-
ment by its lexicographical appellation."
58 Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 868, 296 N.Y.S. 7, 10 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
59 Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1956); Rodgers' Estate, 374 Pa. 246, 97 A.2d
789 (1953); Katz v. Greeninger, 96 Cal. App. 2d 245, 215 P.2d 121 (1950).
60 See McWilliams' Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C. 93 (Orphans' Ct. 1940); Note, Savings Account
Trusts, 49 VA. L. Rav. 1189, 1194 (1963).
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-216 (1963).
62 Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 A. 267 (1905), aff'd 71 N.J. Eq. 777, 71 A. 1135
(1907).
63 N.J. LAws 1906, ch. 195, § 26. Such statutes are common and have generally been
construed as protecting the bank only and not declaring rights as between the contesting parties.
See A. SCoTT, supra note 1, at § 58.3 & n.7.
64 N.J. LAws 1932, chs. 40-43.
65 Howard Savings Inst. v. Kielb, 38 N.J. 186, 202, 183 A.2d 401, 409 (1962).
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The New Jersey trust account is thus cut loose from strict trust theory. It
has some incidents of the tentative trust (e.g., the trust terminates on the pre-
decease of the beneficiary") and some of the revocable trust (e.g., the depositor is
presumed to intend that a present interest vest in the beneficiary at the time of
deposit6"). Resultant confusion in interpretation, however, is minimized by the
clear statutory intent-to give effect to trust accounts, now divested of the ill-
fitting guise of trust.
IV. Problems in Praxis
All trust accounts, be they tentative, revocable, or statutory, generate certain
problems. Some difficulties are conceptual and have been discussed above. Others
arise in practice although they are exacerbated or even caused by theoretical con-
siderations.
The landmarks in the geography of trust account theory are all paradoxes.
For example, if the beneficiary is held to receive no present interest until the
death of the depositor, the transfer is clearly testamentary.68 If, on the other hand,
the beneficiary receives an immediately vested interest in the funds, the ability
of the depositor to do what he likes with the funds, his creditors' right to invade
them, the extinction of the trust should the beneficiary predecease him, etc., are
clear violations of the trust relationship. In both situations, the reservation of
the depositor's right to control the funds, normally a relatively unobjectionable
incident of inter vivos trusts,6" has been extended to the point where it collides
with the interest of the beneficiary and raises serious questions as to the certainty
of the trust's subject matter. Finally, there is no doubt that an attempted transfer
of such property as the donor may own at his death is ineffective during his life
and also after his death unless he has complied with the Statute of Wills.7"
In ascertaining the subject matter of the trust account two alternatives are
available. The trust may consist of the funds originally deposited. If this is so,
the depositor's complete control violates the certainty requirement: at no point
during the depositor's life can the beneficiary say that he is entitled to $X, nor
can he say so after the depositor's death, until his estate is settled. Yet the revo-
cable trust theory must view the money placed in the original deposit as trust
funds. Alternatively, the subject-matter might be said to be the balance on deposit
at the depositor's death, in which case the transfer is obviously testamentary. The
position taken by the New York courts entails this result.
The issue of control is another nub of difficulty. The retention of control by
the depositor of a trust account is almost complete. The "trust," measured against
traditional standards, has been attacked as "illusory"' although its illusory char-
acter depends largely on the identity of the parties disputing it. 'The depositor's
control is evinced by his ability to dispose of the fund as he wishes and by his
immunity from the normal duties of a trustee. For example, he is under no duty
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-216 (1963).
67 Id.
68 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at § 56.
69 Id. at § 57.2.
70 Id. at § 56.2.
71 See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y.S. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
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to preserve the trust property, the duty not to leave funds on deposit in banks for
an inordinate length of time is clearly inapplicable, and there is no duty to segre-
gate trust and personal funds.
Yet another factor consistent with the depositor's complete ownership of the
funds is his tax liability. A trust account is an incomplete transfer for the purposes
of all federal taxes. Gift tax is inapplicable;'2 during the depositor's life, the
income is taxable." Upon his death, the funds are included in his gross estate
for estate tax purposes.7' (In a revocable trust doctrine jurisdiction it is arguable
that since an "interest" passed to the beneficiary at the time of the deposit, transfer
tax is inapplicable. This reasoning has apparently been accepted in Pennsyl-
vania."5 ) The taxation of trust accounts thus provides an island of consistency-
the funds are considered to be the depositor's own.
The rights of creditors to trust account assets are by no means dearly defined,
and a congeries of difficulties has arisen concerning them. As a matter of horn-
book law, the reservation of a power of revocation does not in itself enable credi-
tors of the settlor to reach trust funds."0 Yet creditors are granted this right in the
case of trust accounts,7" at least during the lifetime of the depositor."8 This result
comports with general trust doctrine, however, if the tentative trust theory is ap-
plied. If a settlor is also a beneficiary of the trust, his creditors can generally reach
his beneficial interest.7 In the case of a tentative trust it is arguable that since the
depositor never relinquished any beneficial interest in the funds, his creditors
should be able to reach the entire amount. The revocable trust position, however,
demands the opposite conclusion. If a present interest vests in the beneficiary
(subject to the condition subsequent of revocation) at the moment of deposit, the
depositor's creditors are in no better position than general creditors of the settlor
of a revocable trust. This appears to be the rule in Maryland;8 0 notwithstanding
the control vested in the depositor, the funds are insulated from his creditors-
further evidence of the anomalies which arise when strict trust concepts are incon-
sistently applied under the revocable trust theory. Surely this is a case in which
the trust veil-which, in any event, is rather transparent in the case of trust
accounts-can be lifted.
The tentative and revocable trust doctrines also lead to different conclusions
when creditors assert their claims after the depositor's death. Under the tentative
approach, the trust arises on the death of the depositor. So, conceptually speaking,
does his estate. If the estate is insolvent, the trust constitutes a tranfser made while
the depositor was insolvent (i.e., the moment of his death) and can be set aside
72 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1972).
73 INT. RZV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 676(a).
74 Wasserman v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1944); INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,
§ 2038(a). See generally Lewis, Powers Retained by the Settlor of a Trust: Their Income,
Estate, and Gift Tax Treatment, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 1, 5 (1970).
75 In re Mines, 31 Pa. D. & C. 153 (C.P. 1937). Contra: Peterman's Estate, 56 D. & C.
365 (Orphans' Ct. 1946); accord, semble, McGary Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 49 A.2d 350 (1946).
76 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at § 330.12.
77 Rights of set-off, however, are rarely granted. See Union Trust Co. v. Mullineaux, 173
Md. 124, 194 A. 823 (1937).
78 See, e.g., Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super. 452, 36 A.2d 242
(1944).
79 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at § 330.12.
80 See Fairfaxv. Savings Bank, 175 Md. 136, 199 A. 872 (1938).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
as a fraud on those of his creditors who had claims outstanding when he died."
Funeral and administration expenses, although not covered by the fraud prin-
ciple, can still be paid from trust account assets if the depositor's remaining estate
is insufficient because the presumption that the depositor intended a decent burial
for himself outweighs the presumption that he desired the trust account funds
to pass.2 A clearly fraudulent transfer, of course, can always be set aside, any
balance remaining after satisfaction of creditors' claims to be paid to the bene-
ficiary.' Under the revocable trust analysis (although the problem has not square-
ly arisen) it would seem that, a completed transfer having occurred at the time
of deposit, subsequent creditors could not employ the fraud argument. 4 The
doctrine might even result in insulation of the trust funds from the depositor's
creditors, even though he retains complete control. This situation, apparently
sanctioned by the Maryland courts,85 is yet another anomalous result of the revo-
cable trust theory.
A few courts have been presented with claims against trust account assets
made by the depositor's surviving spouse.8 " Such claims arise when the spouse
elects to claim against the depositor's will or to claim the statutory share of an
intestate depositor's estate. To overcome the spouse's presumed inability to reach
trust property, it must be shown that the quantum of control maintained over the
assets by the decedent in life was so great as to vitiate the trust as such, rendering
it "illusory." ' If the trust was indeed illusory, it is void as a testamentary transfer.8 "
The courts have announced no clear rule under which the result of a claim
by the surviving spouse can be predicted. It would seem that the doctrine under
which the trust account is sustained would substantially control the result-i.e.,
in tentative trust jurisdictions, where the depositor maintains complete beneficial
and legal ownership, the claim should be allowed; whereas in revocable trust
jurisdictions, in which an interest is said to vest in the beneficiary upon deposit,
the contrary should be true. In fact this is not the case. The controlling factor
in the decisions seems to be the definition of "illusory" employed by the court-
no matter what the theoretical justification for the trust account might be. 9
The New York criterion for a nonillusory transfer, articulated in the 1937
case of Newman v. Dore,9 ° is bona fide divestiture of control by the transferor.
The courts utilized this test in a line of cases9 ' to strike down tentative trusts as
illusory when used to deprive the surviving spouse of his share. The rationales for
these decisions may owe more to the weighing of interests represented by the trust
account institution and the statutes providing for survivors' election than to a
81 Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
82 See Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1963).
83 Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N.Y.S. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
84 See Fairfax v. Savings Bank, 175 Md. 136, 199 A. 872 (1938).
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951); Black Estate, 73 Pa.
D. & C. 86 (Orphans' Ct. 1950). But see Iafolla Estate, 380 Pa. 391, 110 A.2d 380 (1955);
Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954).
87 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at § 58.5.
88 Id. at § 57.2.
89 Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1205 (1963).
90 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
91 See, e.g., Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941); Steixner v. Bowery
Say. Bank, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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finding that tentative trusts are per se illusory. (The latter view leads inexorably
to the conclusion that tentative trusts are testamentary and void ab initio.) How-
ever, in 1951 the Court of Appeals reversed the trend of the cases. In Matter of
Halpern9 2 the court announced in a very strong dictum that there is nothing illu-
sory about a tentative trust. It becomes completely effective on the depositor's
death and an inalienable interest vests in the beneficiary. Thus, even a partial
award which had been made by the Surrogate's Court was wrong. If the trust
is not illusory, it is good; and if it is good, it is all good. The trust fund, by its
mere existence, raises an inference of valid transfer."' The transfer, of course,
occurs at death, and the depositor's good faith divestiture thus occurs at that
moment. The rule in Halpern seems to be that the transfer represented by a trust
account is illusory only if the depositor can be shown not to have intended that
the funds pass on his death to the beneficiary. Such a rule produces evidentiary
problems of some magnitude, but there is an additional reason for disapproving it.
It obviously widens the class of transfers that will be upheld to include some-
chiefly, transfers engineered to deprive the surviving spouse of his share-which
are violative of statute and public policy. Scott observes that "surely it is possible
to hold that by the creation of such a trust the settlor may avoid the formalities
involved in the making of a will, but may not accomplish a result which he could
not accomplish by a will, namely to cut out the surviving spouse."" The Restate-
ment takes the position that, although the surviving spouse normally cannot reach
property transferred by the decedent in trust subject to a life estate and power
of revocation remaining in the decedent, an exception should be made in the case
of a trust deposit. "The surviving spouse of a person who makes a savings deposit
upon a tentative trust can include the deposit in computing the share to which
such surviving spouse is entitled." 5
The New York legislature adopted the Restatement view in 1965 by an
amendment to the Decedent Estate Law.96 The balance on deposit at the death
of one whose spouse exercises the right of election is treated as a testamentary
provision and is included in the net estate. Pennsylvania enacted a similar
statute.9 7 New Jersey's statutory sanction of trust accounts has protected them
from all attacks save those based on traditional equitable grounds;98 none has
yet been challenged by a surviving spouse, but the claim would probably fail.
In Maryland, a revocable trust theory jurisdiction, it has been held that a trust
account can be successfully attacked if it is illusory; and the test for illusoriness
involves a showing of intent to defraud.9 Such a result is remarkable only in
view of the fact that only the surviving spouse can challenge a trust account on
the ground that it is illusory." '0 The identity of the party attacking the trust thus
seems to control the result. In all the jurisdictions that have considered the matter,
92 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
93 See Matter of Ward, 279 App. Div. 616, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 817 (2d Dept. 1951).
94 A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at § 58.5.
95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 58, comment e (1959).
96 § 18-a (Laws 1965, c. 665).
97 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1962), as amended PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
6111 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972).
98 Ward v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. 132, 183 A.2d 60 (1962).
99 See, e.g., Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944).
100 Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. Rav. 1189, 1205 (1963).
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the trust account's status as trust has been suspended, at least partially, when it
conflicts with the surviving spouse's elective right-a clear case of subordination
of the wishes of the dead to the interests of the living.
There appears to be substantial consistency in the courts' position on revoca-
tion of trust accounts. The Restatement catalogues five manners in which a trust
account can be terminated in whole or in part.' Each constitutes a "decisive...
declaration of disaffirmance" under the Totten test' 2 Virtually all of the courts
take the Restatement's liberal view and hold the trust revoked when some declara-
tion of the depositor, regardless of its form or whether made inter vivos or by will,
sufficiently expresses or implies the intent to revoke.
1) Withdrawal operates as a pro tanto revocation; the beneficiary is
entitled to the balance on hand at the depositor's death.
2) The death of the beneficiary prior to the death of the depositor termi-
nates the trust absolutely. This position is consistent with the tentative
theory but has been adopted in revocable trust theory jurisdictions as
well.1
03
3) If the depositor disposes of the trust funds by will in favor of someone
other than the beneficiary revocation pro tanto is deemed to have oc-
curred. Except in Maryland it is now settled that a trust account can be
revoked by a provision in the depositor's will indicating-expressly or
impliedly -that such was his intent.'" A specific provision of the will
money in favor of a third person revokes the trust,' but a mere residuary
clause cannot per se revoke the trust.' Curiously, in view of the willing-
ness of the courts to effectuate the depositor's intent, an invalid will-
even coupled with the intent to disaffirm-cannot revoke a trust account
in New York ;107 but it can do so in Pennsylvania."~s
4) If the depositor becomes insane funds may be withdrawn insofar as
necessary for his welfare.' 9
5) If the depositor makes the trust irrevocable, he cannot thereafter
revoke it."0
When an inter vivos declaration or a will does not revoke the trust expressly
but is alleged to do so by implication, the courts tend to look at the res gestae sur-
rounding the action in order to determine the depositor's real intent. The factors
considered are very similar to those examined when the issue is establishment of
a trust by means of a deposit, but some are unique-for example, courts can in-
quire whether the depositor's nontrust assets are sufficient to satisfy his will dis-
101 § 58, comment c.
102 179 N.Y. at 126, 71 N.E. at 752.
103 See Matter of United States Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 102 N.Y.S. 271 (1st Dept.
1907); Hyman v. Tarplee, 64 Cal. App. 2d 805, 149 P.2d 453 (1944); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17:9A-217A (1963).
104 See, e.g., Matter of Krycun, 24 N.Y.2d 710, 301 N.Y.S.2d 970, 249 N.E.2d 753 (1969).
105 Matter of Ludwig, 207 Misc. 860, 140 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
106 Matter of Greniewich, 243 App. Div. 811, 278 N.Y.S. 279 (1935).
107 Re Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
108 Bearinger's Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A.2d 342 (1939).
109 Matter of Sabot, 28 Misc. 2d 265, 212 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
110 Matter of LaBrasche, 301 N.Y. 718, 95 N.E.2d 404, 96 N.E.2d 92 (1950).
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positions. If they are inadequate, several courts have held the trust revoked by
implication, at least in part."' In general, the courts are as willing to give effect
to the depositor's desire to revoke the trust account as they are to give effect to
his desire to establish one; the pivotal issue in both cases is the depositor's intent.1'
IV. Conclusion
The value of the trust account-its utility and convenience as a will sub-
stitute-must be measured against the abuses to which it is subject in practice
and the confusion and inelegance of its theory.
Among potential abuses are the following: avoidance of bank regulations;
avoidance of restrictions on charitable bequests;... avoidance, where permitted,
of the surviving spouse's right of statutory election; and avoidance of probate on
large amounts.
The theoretical objections might appear largely irrelevant. The trust account,
as an institution, is thriving under at least two different rationales, both of which
involve violation of the Statute of Wills. Yet when problems arise in the manage-
ment or application of a trust account, appeal must be made to theory; if the
theory is confused and inelegant, the solution will be confused and inelegant, and
the law will be yet another bit muddier. A solid, defensible position must be
found.
The solution need not be complex; but it must involve facing two facts
squarely: the trust account is a testamentary transfer and it is not a trust. The
answer is legislation, for only legislatures can contravene the Statute of Wills.
Thoughtful legislation can circumvent the abuses noted above and bring a re-
freshing and overdue clarity to the law of trust accounts.:"" Thirty years ago
Professor Moynihan-and he was by no means the first-set out the task the legis-
latures should perform:
It is submitted that the most effective way to deal with the problem of post-
mortem dispositions of savings deposits is directly by legislation. It should
be frankly recognized that the real intent behind most deposits in trust...
is a testamentary one. To meet the needs of a multitude of persons a simple
method for providing for the disposition of the deposit on death, alternative
to that provided by the Statute of Wills, should be provided. Resort to the
overworked fiction of a trust should not be necessary...
In providing a cogent theory of trust deposits, legislation could restore order to
an unclear area of the law and protect the interests and desires of the general
public.
Robert J. Wiftebort, Jr.
111 See, e.g., Matter of Beck, 260 App. Div. 651, 23 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1940). See also Annot.,
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